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Commentary on Professor Gabor's

Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria
Willis L. M. Reese*

I welcome Professor Gabor's analyses of the Hague Draft Convention.1 The Convention is a natural sequel to the United Nations Sales
Convention, which has been ratified by the United States and came into
effect on January 1st of this year. This latter convention deals with the
substantive law of sales and is designed to play a role for the entire world
similar to the one played by the Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States. Undoubtedly, many states will be slow to ratify the Sales Convention, and some will not do so at all. Thus, implementation of rules addressing the issue of applicable law in sales, where the states involved
have different laws in the area, is desirable. This is the task of the Hague
Draft Convention. Professor Gabor argues that "the absence of one welldeveloped body of private international law engenders substantial uncertainty and legal insecurity for both United States and foreign citizens
contemplating transnational legal relationships." 2 This Commentary
will explore the accuracy of Professor Gabor's statement.
Professor Gabor's belief that it would be best if all nations applied
the same choice of law rules in the area of sales is clearly correct, subject
to the proviso that the rules would have to be good ones. To be effective,
rules must be clear and not justifiably subject to varying interpretations.
They must also lead to uniform and desirable results. These objectives
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law Emeritus, Columbia University. Reporter, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS.
1 Professor Gabor has written two articles on international choice of law: Gabor, Emerging
Unificationof Conflict of Laws Rules Applicable in the InternationalSale of Goods, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 696 (1986)[hereinafter Emerging Unification]; Gabor, Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria:
Private InternationalLaw from the United States Perspective, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 538
(1988)[hereinafter Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria]. The latter is a contribution to this
Symposium.
2 Gabor, Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria, supra note 1, at 540.
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are often difficult, if not impossible, to attain in important areas of choice
of law. Take, for example, a rule that the fights of the parties to a contract are determined by the law of the place of making, that is, the state
where the last act necessary to bring the contract into existence occurred.
Such a rule would be easy to apply and could lead to uniform results. It
is also possible, however, that courts would take different views on what
constitutes the last act necessary to make a contract effective. In addition, experience has shown that application of this type of rule often
leads to unfortunate results.' Such an approach would therefore be unacceptable. At the other extreme is the British rule that calls simply for
the application of the "proper law" of the contract. This rule gives
courts ample freedom to reach what they deem to be the correct result in
any particular case. But, it affords little or no predictability of result and
accordingly leaves much to be desired.
The present day solution is an attempt to steer a line somewhere
between these two extremes. Modem codes and conventions, including
the Hague Draft Convention, state quite precisely what law will govern a
particular issue, and then afford flexibility by adding some usually
vaguely phrased escape device. For example, it may be provided that the
usually applicable law should be disregarded if some other state is the
one "most closely connected" 4 or "manifestly more closely connected"'
with the contract. Many European codes and conventions provide additional flexibility with the provision that the normally applicable law is to
be disregarded if its application would
lead to a result that is "manifestly
6
incompatible with public policy.")
These modem codes and conventions, like the Hague Draft Convention, do assure some predictability of result. Inevitably, however, courts
will differ with respect to the circumstances in which the normally applicable rule should be disregarded and solution to the choice of law question found in the vaguely phrased escape provision. It is further to be
expected that escape provisions will be interpreted differently in different
countries and by different courts. In short, uncertainty of result and lack
of predictability are likely to persist despite the widespread adoption of a
choice of law convention. To be sure, these evils would be mitigated if,
as Professor Gabor suggests, some international body could be given ulti3 It would, for example, lead with fair frequency to the application of the law of a state that has
no significant contact with either the parties or the transaction.
4 See, ag., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, European Economic
Communities, art. 4, June 19, 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L266) 1 (1980).
5 Hague Draft Convention, art. 8(3).
6 Id. art. 18.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

8:570(1988)

mate authority to determine the proper interpretation of a convention. 7
Such a solution is hardly practical in this day and age, however.
Further, disparity in the results that would be reached in a given
case by application of different choice of law rules must not be exaggerated. It might be difficult to find many cases where substantially different
results would be reached by application of the British "proper law" approach instead of the approach of Section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. It is thought that the same would be true if the
approach of the French courts were substituted. This is because the
same basic value-protection of the justified expectations of the partiesunderlies the contract law of most countries. It is to be expected that the
courts will apply their choice of law rules in a way that will uphold this
common value.
The rule governing the autonomy of parties also supports the proposition that differently phrased choice of law rules need not lead to different substantive results. It is almost universally agreed that parties can
select the law that will govern their contract. This rule, however, is
phrased somewhat differently in different countries. In common law
countries, it is subject to qualifications: the state of the chosen law must
have a reasonable relationship to the parties to the contract, or application of the chosen law should not violate a fundamental policy of the
state having the greatest concern with the case. 8
In European countries the rule is phrased without qualifications,
which would suggest that the contracting parties have complete power to
choose the governing law. This impression is erroneous. Civil law courts
will not apply the chosen law if its application would violate the public
policy of the forum.9 European courts will look to certain laws (lois
d'application immediate, lois de police)I° before they even turn to the
choice of law question. Such laws usually belong to the forum, but there
are indications that a court will also give considerati6n to "policy-type"
laws of other states." It therefore cannot be said that contracting parties
in civil law countries have more power to choose the law governing their
contract than they would have in common law countries.
My statements should not be taken as serious criticism of Professor
Gabor's article. It would certainly be desirable if all states applied the
same choice of law rules. It would be difficult, however, to reach agree7 Gabor, Emerging Unification, supra note 1.
8 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
9 See, e.g., Hague Draft Convention, art. 18.

10 Lando, The 1985 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Sales, 51 RABEI1S, ZErrSCHRIFT 60, 77-78 (1987).

11 See, e.g., Hague Draft Convention, art. 7.
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ment on such rules, and there is always the strong possibility that these
rules would be interpreted differently in different states. Even in the absence of uniform choice of law rules, the world will continue to rotate on
its axis.

